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SHARIF AL MUJAHID 
 
The present paper consists of four parts.  First, it is argued why the Quaid-i-
Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), concentrated for the most part on 
political issues and political freedom, why he went in for Islam as the cultural 
metaphor in arguing the case for Pakistan, and why he opted for couching his 
marathon (1937–47) discourse in Islamic terms.  Second, the legacy in terms of the 
primacy of economic factors in propelling a colonised people towards political 
emancipation Jinnah had received from the historic realm and his own background—
in particular, the economic bias in his family background, in Bombay’s mercantile 
culture which was almost at the centre of the most formative influences in his early 
life, and in the pronouncements of, and proposals mooted by, Muslim leaders from 
Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) down to Iqbal (1877–1938) on the one hand, 
and by the Mohammedan Educational Conference (f.1836) to the All India Muslim 
League (1906–47), on the other.  These proposals were essentially aimed at 
exhorting the intelligentsia to work for the social, economic and political uplift of the 
masses.  Third, the stress on economic emancipation and the rise of Muslim 
economic nationalism in the 1940s, in the wake of the Lahore Resolution (1940), has 
been discussed and delineated briefly. 
Fourth, an attempt has been made to set forth, as systematically as is possible 
for a student of another discipline, Jinnah’s economic ideas, extracted from his 
multitudinous pronouncements, which could serve as guidelines for the economic 
reconstruction of Pakistan, wherever feasible. Since the avalanche of political 
developments kept Jinnah so preoccupied during (1940–47), consuming all his 
waking hours, he had little time to give thought to the economic policies of the state 
he had demanded.1 Nor did he have the expertise to give an “eco-vision” or a 
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structured and systematically worked out economic “system”.  Hence, except for 
some general remarks here and there, he had said precious little about the economic 
system that would be enforced in Pakistan.  But some idea can be had in the speeches 
of  Z. H. Lari (1915–73), Tamizuddin Khan (d. 1963), and Hamid Nizami (d.1962) 
who moved or supported the resolution on the Planning Committee at the Karachi 
(1943) League, and in the Punjab Provincial League Manifesto (1944).  For one 
thing, Jinnah was presiding at Karachi, for another, he did not contradict them in his 
concluding remarks.  The manifesto, drawn up by the Left-oriented Danial Latifi, 
was, of course, an official document, but it is improbable that Jinnah’s concurrence 
should have been sought before its issuance.  Yet, it would not have been drawn up 
the way it was, without its core principles being generally reflective of Jinnah’s 
thinking in the matter.  Even so, it needs to be pointed out that Lari, Tamizuddin and 
Latifi were rather heavily influenced by the leftist discourse and rhetoric prevalent 
since Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1919)’s and Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945)’s 
ascendancy in Congress’s politics, but Jinnah, an early believer in the laissez faire 
credo, in competition and survival of the fittest, was obviously not.  Yet he didn’t 
disown or contradict Lari, Tamizuddin and Latifi for the simple reason that he knew, 
more than any one else, that as leader of a nationalist coalition his supreme job at the 
moment was to solidity the consensus all the more, by further cementing, rather than 
disrupting, the  coalition.  Till the arrival of Pakistan and a fair weather, settlement of 
the doctrinaire question could as well be put on the back burner, and the 
controversial and divisive issues postponed.  Even so, the general principles set forth 
in the Lari et al. speeches and the manifesto, which may be taken as tentative 
guidelines to the Muslim League’s, if not Jinnah’s, thinking on the economic 




Jinnah was essentially a student and practitioner of politics.  He had a 
panchant for only two things in life: law and politics.  Law was meant to provide him 
with a comfortable living, so that he didn’t have to make a profession of  politics, so 
that he didn’t have to live off politics.  And in the late 1930s, when the daunting 
pressure of political developments and his own developing role as Muslim India’s 
sole spokesman claimed his undivided attention, he almost said quit to his 
profession, except for a critical or prestigious case or two.  It is seldom realised how 
he came to politics.   He had developed a panchant for it while listening to the great 
British nineteenth century liberal stalwarts in the House of Commons during the 
early months of his stay (1892–96) in London.  And it was this newly developed 
panchant that had led him to abandon his initial  “business-training” plans and opt 
for law.  And that panchant stayed with him till the end. 
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Jinnah’s legal background and constitutional expertise coupled with his 
“sagacity, shrewdness and political flair” would catapult him, in good time, as a 
“political animal” of the rarest caliber on the Indian scene.  It would as well exalt 
him as a statesman to a point that the Aga Khan (1877–1957), himself a statesman, 
considered him as “the most remarkable of all the great statesmen that I have 
known”.2   Given  Jinnah’s overriding commitment to politics and political action 
and his belief  in their efficacy in resolving  problems of all sorts, it is not too 
surprising that, a la Ghana’s  Nkrumah, he believed, “seek ye  the political kingdom 
and all things shall be added unto you”.3    
In demanding Pakistan, therefore, Jinnah was seeking the political kingdom, 
hoping, if not secure in the knowledge, that everything else would fall into place, 
sooner or later, once that kingdom was secured.  His priority and urgency for getting 
a territorial base and sovereign powers over it were underlined in, among others, his 
public meeting address at Bombay on 12 August 1945, at the outset of his marathon 
campaign for a clear Muslim verdict in the critical (1945–46) elections: 
... We shall have time to quarrel among ourselves and we shall have time 
when these differences have to be settled, when wrongs and injustices will have to be 
remedied.  We shall have time for domestic programme and policies, but first get the 
Government.   This is a nation without any territory or any Government.4 
The Pakistan demand was raised on the premise that Hindus and Muslims 
were two separate nations or, more specifically, that Muslim by themselves were a 
nation in their own right in the subcontinental context, and hence, were entitled to 
the right of self-determination.  Raised in ideological and political terms for the most 
part, the demand was argued at the macro level, with Islam as the cultural metaphor.  
For  Muslims in pre-partition  India,  with their deep  horizontal, vertical, regional 
and linguistic cleavages, Islam alone could serve as a monolithic framework, 
gathering all the Muslims under the all-embracing Pakistan canopy.  Moreover, it 
was a comprehensive framework, a broad-based platform transcending their intra-
communal cleavages, and representing a cluster of shared beliefs, ideals and 
concepts that had become deeply ingrained in the social consciousness of Muslims 
over time, that had become enmeshed with the subterranean vagaries of their 
ancestral heritage and ethos, and that moreover, was charged and saturated with 
emotions.  Hence the choice of Islam as the rallying cry.5   But the point and force 
for the  demand and the astonishing  response it elicited was provided by the ground 
reality—social apartheid, cultural sufferance and economic deprivation, and all that 
 
2The Memoirs of Aga Khan  (London: Cassell, 1954), pp. 298–99.  
3Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana  (New York:  Nelson,  1957), pp. 162–63. 
4Khurshid Ahmad Khan Yusufi (ed.), Speechs, Statments and Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam, 
(Lahore:  Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1996), III:  2039.  
5For detailed discussion, see, Sharif al Mujahid, Ideology of Pakistan (Islamabad: Islamic 
Research  Institute, 2001), Chapters 2 & 3.  
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on the basis of religion.  Even so, inherent in the call for exorcising the colonial 
political bondage or scuttling the looming specter of a nascent Hindu raj was a call 
for an end to economic bondage and for basing the economic system on an equitable 
basis.  “We wish”, said Jinnah, arguing the case for Pakistan on 22 March 1940, “our 
people to develop to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political 
life in a way that we think best, and in consonance with our own ideals and 
according to the genius of our people”.6     Thus, in perspective, the three major goals 
of the Pakistan movement were: (i) political independence; (ii) ideological 
resurgence; and (iii) economic emancipation. 
 
II 
  Despite his deep involvement in politics and political problems of the day, 
despite the overriding, daunting and time-consuming task of crafting a viable 
political destiny for the nation, despite his day-to-day political rhetoric, despite his 
discourse being couched in Islamic terms—despite all this, Jinnah was still not too 
oblivious of the propelling force of economic factors in generating, fomenting and 
spawning great movements in history. For one thing metropolitan Bombay’s  
mercantile culture with its laissez faire credo sanctifying competition and survival of 
the fittest, along with his own Khoja, business background, was among the core 
formative influences  in Jinnah’s early life7  when he struggling to carve out for 
himself a place  at the bar.  And this culture underscored the primacy of economic 
interests.  For another, as indicated in his State Bank address (see below), he had 
witnessed how divergent and competing economic interests among European powers 
had spawned two global wars.   At another level, Jinnah had received influences 
from the historic realm in respect of Muslim India’s most pressing and dire 
problems.  Muslim economic backwardness since the loss of political power had 
been endemic, warranting proposals to redeem them economically since the time of 
Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. Alongwith Muslim educational and social 
underdevelopment, they figure routinely in the resolutions of the Mohammedan 
Educational Conference and of the All India Muslim League, year after year.  In his 
penultimate letter to Jinnah dated 28 May 1937, Iqbal had warned that 
 ... a political organisation  which gives no promise of improving the lot of the 
average Muslim cannot attract our masses ... our political institutions have 
never thought of improving the lot of Muslims generally ... The problem of 
bread is becoming more and more acute.  The Muslim has begun to feel that 
he has been going down and down during the last 200 years.... The question 
therefore is:  how is it possible to solve the problem of Muslim poverty? And 
 
6Yusufi, Speeches, Statments and Message of the Quaid-i-Azam, II: 1183.  
7See Sharif al Mujahid , “Jinnah and the Congress Party”, in D. A. Low (ed.), The Indian 
National Congress:  Centenary Hindsights, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 208–10.  
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the whole future of the [Muslim] League depends on the League’s activity to 
solve this question”.8 
And to Iqbal,  “the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as 
well as to secure a peaceful India” lay, he felt, in setting up “a free Muslim state or 
states”.9  The Indian National Congress (f.1885) had as well acknowledged Muslims’ 
economic backwardness as a core problem, as indicated by its Muslim mass contact 
campaign during 1937–38, when it tried to reach the Muslim masses over the head of 
their accredited leaders, in the name of bread and freedom. 
Jinnah himself was acutely aware of this chronic problem of Muslim 
economic,  social and educational backwardness, which had precluded Muslims from 
competing with others on level ground for scarce resources.  At the Lucknow (1937) 
League, on October 1937, he gave a call for “a constructive and ameliorative 
programme of work for the people’s welfare, and... for the social, economic and 
political uplift of the Musalmans”; at the Calcutta (1938) League,  on 17 April  1938, 
he called for formulating plans which would give Muslims “immediate relief from 
the poverty and wretchedness from which they are suffering more than any other 
section of the  people of India”; at the Lahore (1940) League, on 22 March 1940, he 
exhorted the Muslim  intelligentsia to “organise the people economically, socially, 
educationally and politically”; and at the Madras (1941) League, on 14 April 1941, 
he called for a five-year plan for the educational, economic and political upliftment.10  
 
III 
With the adoption of the Lahore resolution, the Muslims had shed their 
minority complex, which had hitherto made them hostage to political problems and 
political issues, and to resolving the communal question.  No wonder, the tackling of 
their deleterious socioeconomic issues, which were eating into the vitals of their 
national life, was made contingent to the arrival of a fair political weather.  Now that  
the Muslims had finally resolved upon a ultimate political destiny, economic 
emancipation  of Muslims as a whole, and, more particularly, of the Muslim majority 
provinces (which had housed barely 9.6 percent of the total industrial establishments 
in India in 194511  claimed their focus.  Indeed, inherent in the Pakistan demand was 
the aspiration to undertake and accomplish the economic reconstruction of the 
Pakistan areas.  Thus, it was an undeclared, but implicitly acknowledged, core 
objective of the Pakistan movement.  After all, what use Pakistan without being 
economically viable? What use political independence without economic 
independence? What use a territorial base and sovereignty without ensuring decent 
 
8Iqbal to Jinnah, 28th  May 1937, Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah  (Lahore: Ashraf, 1943), pp. 14–15.    
9Ibid.  
10Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (ed.) Foundations of Pakistan (Karachi: National Publishing House 
Ltd., 1970), II:  272, 295, 339 and 360.   
11 C. N. Vakil (ed.) Economic Consequences of Divided India (Bombay: 1950), pp. 247–250.  
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living standards to the teeming millions inhabiting it?  “No nation and no people can 
ever do anything very much without making themselves economically powerful in 
commerce, trade and industry”, emphasised Jinnah.12  The Hindu (and Congress’s) 
opposition to Pakistan was perceived to have stemmed, in part, from their desire to  
exploit the Muslims both politically and economically and, apart from deprivation of  
political power, their, economic neglect and backwardness constituted the 
justification  for our demand for Pakistan. 
The new stress on economic emancipation spawned the rise of economic 
nationalism among Muslims, and propelled the Muslim League to the adoption of a 
strong economic platform by, climaxing in the establishment of a Planning 
Committee at the Karachi (1943). League, where Jinnah stressed the dire need for 
“educational planning, economic planning, [and] social planning”.13  The Committee 
was charged with, among others, preparing (i) “a practical programme ... for the 
economic and industrial advancement of the Muslims in India”, and (ii) “A five-year 
plan for economic reconstruction and industrial development of the Pakistan 
Provinces.14 Lack of expertise in these fields delayed the formation of the Committee 
till 23 August 1944.  However, it was able to finalise Part I of the report at Bombay 
on 30 June – 2 July 1945.  Part I dealt with the “general principles and broad lines of 
policy” which were aimed at improving the living standards of the Muslim masses in 
the subcontinent as a whole.15  Part II, dealing with the economic resources of the 
Pakistan areas and the preparation of a blue-print of economic development for them, 
could, however, not be finalised before the emergence of Pakistan.  Interestingly 
though, this was in stark contrast to the homework done by the Congress; which had 
set up a National Planning Committee (NPC) under Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.  Its 29 
sub-committees had worked strenuously for two years, making India plan-conscious 
and inspiring industrial tycoons and others to build upon their work and produce two 
comprehensive plans during the war year—the Bombay Plan (1944), chiefly 
sponsored by Tata and Birla, and the leftist-oriented M. N. Roy’s People’s Plan 
(1944).  Upon independence, a modified version of these plans was adopted as 
India’s Industrial Resolution Policy (IRP) on 6 April 1948. 
Although Jinnah’s plan to have a viable blue-print for the economic 
reconstruction ready before Pakistan’s emergence got delayed, he had yet launched 
upon a series of steps since 1942 to set up institutions, providing a skeletal 
infrastructure for economic reconstruction. With the assistance of Muslim 
industrialists, business magnates and entrepreneurs he was able to set up a chain of 
financial and industrial institutions and commercial enterprises which would provide 
 
12Cited in Pervez Tahir, Economic and Social Thinking of the Quaid-i-Azam (Lahore: Research 
Society of  Pakistan), p. 33.    
13Pirzada, Foundation of Pakistan, IIL 450.   
14Ibid., II:468 and Yusufi,  Statements, Speeches and Messages,  III: 1844-45.   
15Hasan, Quaid-i-Azam’s Unrealised Dream, pp. 42, 55–96.  
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the basic economic infrastructure for the new state—institutions and enterprises such 
as All India Muslim Chambers of Commerce and Industry (f.1945), banks, 
newspapers, an airline and a steamship company, which would enable Pakistan to 
offer economic opportunities to Muslims  when it came into being.  Thus, in a sense, 
by 1947, Muslim economic nationalism had come of age.16    
 
IV 
As indicated earlier, the proposal to set up a Planning Committee “to prepare 
a comprehensive scheme for a five-year programme for economic and social  uplift” 
at the Karachi (1943) League, on 25 December 1943, was a landmark decision  in all 
the annals of the Muslim League.  The resolution embodying the proposal spoke of 
state indsutralisation in the Pakistan areas, introduction of free primary education, 
reform of the land system, stabilisation of rent, security of tenure to farmers, 
improvement in the condition of labour and agriculture, and control of money 
lending. The speeches by Z. H. Lari, MLA (U.P.) who moved the resolution, and 
Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan MLA (Bengal) and Hamid Nazami, Editor, Nawa-i-Waqt 
(Lahore) who seconded and supported it, provide some guidelines to Muslim 
league’s and probably Jinnah’s, thinking on the subject. Lari stressed the need for the 
uplift of  “the social, educational, and economic condition of the proletariat”, for 
making primary education “free and compulsory” and revamping the curriculum to 
meet Islamic and modern compulsory” and revamping the curriculum to meet 
Islamic and modern requirements; for establishing “state industries” so as to give 
“labourers ... a fairdeal”; for lowering land taxes and protecting the rights of the 
tiller—all this to “benefit ... the proletariat”.  Tamizuddin Khan emphasised that no 
economic progress was possible without terminating political subjugation, and that 
“the liquidation of illiteracy was of prime importance”, that “complete 
industrialisation of the country”, with “the essential industries... run by the state”, 
should be their goal.  Hamid Nizami pointed out that “Musaleman’s are a nation of 
poor people” and that their needs be attended to urgently.17   
The Punjab Muslim League manifesto, penned by Daniyal Latifi, sought to 
build upon these and other general principles aired by Jinnah over time, to write a 
somewhat detailed blue-print. It committed the League to, among others, communal 
harmony, civil liberties, and equitable gradation of salaries in the public services, 
free compulsory primary education, the individual’s right to work, the nationalisation 
of key industries and banks, and the subjection of private industry to state planning.  
It opposed “monopolies and vested interests detrimental to the general prosperity of 
the people”. It promised “strict enforcement of international conventions and 
 
16 See Naureen Talha,  Economic Factors in the Making of Pakistan (1921–1947) (Karachi: 
Oxford,  2000), Chapter  5. 
17Pirzada,  Foundation of Pakistan, II: 467–70.  
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agreements for the welfare of the workers”, reduced working hours and a reasonable 
minimum wage for labour, and “recognition of the principle of collective 
bargaining—and the right to go on strike”.  It called for  “a  state plan for agricultural 
development based on the welfare of the small zamindar, the peasant and the land 
less agriculturist who form  the vast majority of the producers”; for  “a  progressive 
wiping out of past agricultural debts”, and the “elimination of the very causes of 
indebtedness”.  It also called for the “humanising of the conditions of agricultural 
labour—by legislation following the principles of legislation for the protection of 
factory and industrial labour”. It recommended that the “Crown lands” be “employed 
to remedy and not to aggravate social evils, to mitigate and not to accentuate the 
polarisation of wealth”.18  
The Bengal Provincial Muslim League, under the inspiration of its pro-left 
General Secretary,  Abul Hashim  (1943–47), also brought out a radical manifesto 
before the critical 1945-46 elections.  Likewise, the budget proposals presented by 
Liaquat Ali Khan (1895–1951) as Finance Minister in the Interim government (1946–
47) was anti-capitalistic.  It was hailed as a ‘poor man’s budget’ and caused an uproar 
in the (Hindu) capitalist circles, and among the Mahajan, Bania, big business and 
mercantile classes, which had long provided a financial clout to the congress. 
These economic ideas are those, which were aired in Jinnah’s presence, or in 
official documents, which he was not directly associated with, but which he did not 
feel necessary to approve or contradict at the time.  There are, however, some ideas, 
which he himself had mooted on various occasions, and these are among the primary 
sources in respect of his economic ideas.  
These ideas indicate that his principal aim was the amelioration of the poor 
and the upliftment of the masses on various counts and in all respects.  In politics he 
had sought and strived for the ‘political kingdom’ in the firm hope that it would help 
solve their problems.  While feverishly engaged in building up a nationalist coalition 
and a consensus, he could not possibly shun the landlords and the capitalists and shut 
out the Muslim League’s door in their face.  Even so, he repeatedly administered 
timely warning against their exploiting the masses for their selfish ends. 
As in politics so in economics, he was flexible and pragmatic.  In neither of 
them he doctrinaire, opting out all the time for the “art of the possible”.  Despite his 
initial commitment to laissez faire, he did not favour the adoption of the Western 
economic system the whole way nor did he countenance collectivist and centrally  
controlled communist patterns.   He told the State Bank of Pakistan inaugural  
gathering on 1 July 1948. 
The economic system of  the West has created almost  insoluble problems for 
humanity... It has failed to do justice between man and man and to eradicate friction 
 
18Talha, Economic Factors..., p. 128; and “Economic Aspects of the Pakistan Movement”, 
Viewpoint,  (Lahore: III : 32,  19 March 1978), pp. 7-8 and 27.  
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from the international field.  On the contrary, it was largely responsible for the two 
World Wars... The Western world, in spite of its advantages of mechanisation and 
industrial efficiency, is today in a worse mess than ever before in history.  The 
adoption of western economic theory and practice will not help us in achieving our 
goal of creating a happy and contented people.19     
He considered the capitalist system “vicious” and  “wicked”  which exploits 
the masses and  denies them even “one meal a day”,  “If that is the idea of Pakistan, I 
would not have it”,  he told the Delhi (1943) League on 24 April 1943.20   His 
supreme guideline to the Planning Committee was epitomised in one sentence;  ‘Our 
ideal should not be capitalistic but Islamic, and the interests and welfare of the 
people as a whole should be kept constantly in mind’ (5 November 1944).21  Sixteen 
months later, on 27 February 1946, he told the Muslim League workers at Calcutta. 
I am an old man.  God has given me enough to live comfortably at this age.  
Why would I turn my blood into water, run about and take so much trouble.  
Not for the capitalists surely, but for you, the poor people ... in Pakistan, we 
will do all in our power to see that everybody can get a decent living.22      
In the post-Pakistan period, Jinnah had often talked of “Islamic social justice”.  
For instance, he told the mammoth crowd at a public reception at Chittagong on 26  
March 1948: “...Pakistan should be based on social justice and Islamic socialism 
which emphasises  equality and brotherhood of man”.23  His socialism, however, did 
not envisage collectivist and coercive communist patterns, since he stood all the way 
for encouraging trade and commerce, and individual initiative and private enterprise 
in undertaking industrialisation. 
Thus, Jinnah was not committed to any particular ideological mode of economy.  
Actually, he stood for a mixed economy, with emphasis on trade, industrialisation and 
full employment opportunities for one and all.  Indeed, an egalitarian economic system, 
which ensures social justice and economic equity and becomes instrumental in 
establishing an egalitarian social structure.   Hence, his repeated emphasis on Islamic 
social justice.  This means that he stood for an economic system, which should be 
conducive to the development of a Muslim persona, and the growth of human 
personality in the best traditions of Islam.  An Islamic economic system is, however, 
not merely confined to, and should not be confused with, the controversial riba 
question, as is generally done, but a system based on Islamic values.  Under this 
 
19Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947-48, (Islamabad: 
Directorate Films and Publications, 1989), p. 271.    
20Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan,  II:  424–25.  
21Jinnah’s address to the Planning Committee, 5 November 1944, cited in Hasan,  Quaid-i-Azam’s 
Unrealised Dream,  p. 33.  
22Yusufi,  Speeches, Statements and Messages,  IV:  2211–12.  
23Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and  Statements 1947-48,  p. 204. 
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system, to quote Professor Fazlur Rahman.24 “Any large-scale violation of these [four 
fundamental rights for the individual—(i) Life;  (ii) religion; (iii) acquisition of wealth 
and ownership of property; and  (iv) personal honour or dignity  (‘ird)]—including, of 
course, demeaning man through sheer poverty would constitute ‘corruption on earth’ ”.  
No wonder, to quote him again. 
Emphatic statements concerning amelioration of the poor were made from the 
beginning of Islam (indeed, this coupled with the unity of God was the motive 
force for the genesis of the Islamic movement).... The basic élan of the Qur’an 
—the stress on socio-economic justice and essential human egalitarianism—is 
quite clear from its very early passages.  Now all that follows by way of 
Qur’anic legislation in the field of private and public life, even the “five 
pillars” of  Islam  that are held to be religion par excellence, has social justice 
and  the building of an egalitarian community as its end.25  
Since Islam represents a middle way between exploitative capitalism and 
coercive communism, it promotes an egalitarian economic and social structure, 
ensuring human resource development and socio-economic justice, Jinnah had a 
clear perception of the incompatibility of Western economic philosophies and 
practices—i.e., both the capitalist and the communist approaches—for the emerging 
new-Islamic countries.  Hence his call to the State Bank to evolve “banking practices 
compatible with Islamic ideals of social and economic life”, and to Pakistan to 
“present to the world and [Islamic] economic system” which would “secure the 
welfare, happiness and prosperity of mankind”.26  In making this call Jinnah 
presented himself as a seer, a man with a wider vision and deeper insight, looking far 
ahead of his times.  After all, Islamic economics has put forth its claims as a sub-unit 
in the discipline barely twenty-five years ago. 
The delineation of the basic details of Jinnah’s “economic philosophy” may 
be summarised briefly.  Jinnah stood for the development of the industrial potential 
along with agriculture.  He wished to give the economy an industrial bias.  
Industrialisation itself was conceived as the key to self-reliance and economic 
independence, in order to reach out to the goals of economic freedom and self-
sufficiency.   He seemed to favour labour intensive industrialisation, which would 
provide for optimal employment opportunities to the masses.  He stood for 
associating individual initiative and private enterprise at every stage of 
industrialisation, and except for certain key industries (mostly relating to defence and 
communications) all other industrial enterprises should be open to private enterprise.  
While he stressed the importance of commerce and trade as “the very life-blood of 
 
24Fazlur Rahman,  Major Themes of the Qur’an (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca  Islamica, 2nd edn., 
1989), p. 46; see also pp.  38–39.  
25Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp.16–19.   
26Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah:  Speeches and Statements 1947-48, p. 271.   
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the nation”, he cautioned traders and merchants that “in building up their fortunes”,  
they should not “forget their social responsibility for a fair and square deal to one 
and all, big and small”.27  Not only in the afore-mentioned address to the Karachi 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry on   27 April  1948, but also on other occasions, 
Jinnah had pled for a contented labour28 and, by implication, for human resource 
development at all levels.  Likewise, he pled the cause of the agriculturists and the 
producers, arguing, “... if you want to control [the prices of ] food grains, you must 
equally ... control the prices of all other essential articles ... it is no use oppressing 
only the agriculturist and the producer and giving undue advantages to other interests 
at the cost of farmers”.29  This means that he was in favour of extending subsidies to 
the farmers. 
To sum up, then.  In essence, Jinnah stood for structural changes in the 
economy.  He stood for a balanced and mixed economy with a pragmatic blend of 
the agricultural and industrial sectors, resulting in a more equitable distribution of 
wealth.  He stood for full employment opportunities for one and all, for a contented 
labour, for a fair deal to the farmer, and for human resource development at all 
levels.  His Islamic economic system is, thus, a system, which ensures economic 
equity and social justice to one and all, without any discrimination whatsoever. 
 
27Ibid., p. 255.  
28Ibid.,  p. 71. 
29Pirzada,  Foundations of Pakistan, II : 454. 
